

VZCZCXYZ0000  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #2222/01 3192130  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 152130Z NOV 07  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9715  
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 6573  
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 1589  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1947  
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0157  
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 1470  
RUEHQD/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 1028  
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0034  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0083  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFIS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMCUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFIS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE  
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 002222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FBI FOR OIO AD TOM FUENTES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2027  
TAGS: PTER PREL AR IR  
SUBJECT: AMIA: MFA READOUT FROM MARRAKECH AND NEXT STEPS

Classified By: DCM Tom P. Kelly for reasons 1.4(b)and(d)

¶1. (S) Summary: GOA is very pleased with the results of the November 7 Interpol General Assembly vote in Marrakech and credits its success to its close coordination with, and the efforts of, the USG. The GOA has seen no "diffusion" notice from Iran regarding the GOI's stated intention to seek international capture notices for five former Argentine judicial and government officials in connection with the case. Interpol also told the MFA it had received no communications from Iran. Fully cognizant of the need to continue to pursue the AMIA case, the MFA is taking a cautious approach regarding possible next steps. Pushing countries to make public statements of support could backfire, in the GOA's view. Gonzalez stressed that continued coordination with the USG would be critical, and asked that we maintain close contact with the MFA on this issue. Separately, the head of DAIA Aldo Donzis told the Ambassador November 15 that the Argentine Jewish community looked forward to working closely with the U.S. on next steps. End Summary.

U.S. Efforts Key

-----

¶2. (S) DCM, LegAtt, and PolOff met with Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez on November 14 to get his readout of the Interpol vote in Marrakech and to ask about the GOA's proposed next steps. Gonzalez said that the success was due to the coordinated efforts of the MFA and USG agencies. He particularly praised the work of FBI/OIA Director Tom Fuentes in Marrakech, whom he said managed the issue well, was very discreet, had just the right touch with other delegations, and helped to keep him (Gonzalez) calm. He stated that U.S. support had been "just right" -- effective, but not too heavy or public.

Iranians Put Worst Foot Forward

-----

¶3. (C) In contrast, he noted that the Iranians continued to be their own worst enemies in Marrakech. First, they

heavy-handedly made the issue a public and political issue while accusing the GOA of doing so. Secondly, they lobbied too hard in Marrakech, alienating potential allies. Gonzalez said the Iranian official delegation numbered 19, and that at least another 10 Iranians were working the hotel corridors. At the end of the day, the other delegations were fed up with the Iranians. Gonzalez laughingly explained that at a reception hosted by the U.S. Delegation, he saw the Iranians even tried to lobby U.S. Delegation members. He said the Iranians were also leaking "anonymous" stories about South African Executive Committee President Selebi's legal problems back home. This, according to Gonzalez, turned some against the Iranians, who felt they had crossed the line.

¶4. (C) Gonzalez said they had not seen or heard anything from the Iranians on their reported indictments of five former Argentine judicial and government officials, wanted for "damaging" the Republic for their actions in the investigation of the 1994 terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center. They were checking the wire services for any "diffusion" notices from Iran (alerting Interpol members to the indictments), but had seen nothing as of 14 November. Their contacts in Lyon say that no such request has reached the Interpol secretariat yet.

Moving Cautiously

---

¶5. (S) Gonzalez said that the GOA does not intend to say anything publicly unless the report turns out to be true. If that proves to be the case, the GOA will publicly denounce the exercise as a transparently cynical move that violates the spirit of the Interpol general Assembly's recent decision in Marrakech. He said, however, that the GOA does not/not intend to pressure other governments to take a public stand on this; they think it would be counterproductive. For example, he said that seeking OAS support for Argentina might force leftist governments in the region that have tacitly helped Argentina in Marrakech (Venezuela, which didn't send a delegation, and Ecuador, which reportedly supported Argentina) to take a public stand, and they may well balk at lining up against Iran in public. He said that Cuba and Nicaragua voted with Iran, but thought that Argentina carried the rest of the Latin American governments present in Marrakech. Pushing them to make explicit statements of support, either unilaterally or in regional fora, would likely not be successful, he said. Gonzalez added that the Argentines remain angry about Brazil's abstention, and confirmed that the MFA leaked news of its ire to the local press on the day after the vote. He argued that Venezuela acted in a more principled manner than Brazil, and that, in fact, Venezuela's non-attendance was a sign of strong political support for the GOA, given that regime's ties to Tehran.

¶6. (S) Gonzalez said that the GOA had not decided yet on what steps to take next, but is well aware that Iran will not give up and that much remains to be done. At the same time, he expressed the concern that the USG not get ahead of the GOA on next steps. Gonzalez noted that the success in Marrakech was due to the close cooperation between our two governments, stressing this coordination needs to continue. He asked us to keep the GOA informed of our plans. Gonzalez agreed with us that that additional evidence being developed by AMIA prosecutor Nisman -- and possible additional indictments -- could provide another excellent opportunity to more aggressively push this issue.

¶7. (C) Ambassador discussed developments with Aldo Donzis, the head of the Delegation of Argentine Israeli Associations (DAIA), the Jewish community's main political organization. Donzis was very happy with the decision in Morocco, but added that he realized much hard work remained and said he looked forward to working with the USG to bring attention to the red notices, to encourage others to respect them, and to take additional steps to see justice achieved in this case.

WAYNE